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We calculate an achievable secret key rate for quantum key distribution with a finite number of
signals, by evaluating the min-entropy explicitly. The min-entropy can be expressed in terms of the
guessing probability, which we calculate for d-dimensional systems. We compare these key rates to
previous approaches using the von Neumann entropy and find non-zero key rates for a smaller num-
ber of signals. Furthermore, we improve the secret key rates by modifying the parameter estimation
step. Both improvements taken together lead to non-zero key rates for only 104 − 105 signals. An
interesting conclusion can also be drawn from the additivity of the min-entropy and its relation to
the guessing probability: for a set of symmetric tensor product states the optimal minimum-error
discrimination (MED) measurement is the optimal MED measurement on each subsystem.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is the establishment
of a random secure key between two authorized parties,
Alice and Bob, which are connected with each other via
a quantum and a classical channel [1]. Qubits (e.g. pho-
tons) are distributed over this quantum channel, and in
practical implementations the number of these particles
is finite. Dealing with these finite resources, a new branch
in quantum key distribution (QKD) emerged, the finite-
key analysis. It investigates secure key rates, i.e. the
ratio of a secure key length to the number of signals
sent through the channel, in the non-asymptotic situa-
tion. The security of a finite key for a composable secu-
rity definition [2–4] was proven in [5–10]. It is important
to notice that composability means that the key estab-
lished by QKD can be used safely in any application such
as one-time-pad encryption. For a review on practical
QKD and its security, see e.g. Refs. [11, 12]. Calcula-
tions of finite key rates were done in [9, 13, 14] and in
[15] for d dimensions. The relevance of finite QKD was
shown in [16]: practical implementations of QKD lead
to a dramatically lower secure key rate in comparison to
asymptotic theoretical predictions.
The paper is organized as follows: in Sec. II we de-
scribe a general QKD protocol, in Sec. III we review a
bound for the statistical error in parameter estimation
and show that former results on the secret key rate [9] can
be improved by considering a POVM with two outcomes.
In Sec. IV we concentrate on quantifying the secret key
length after privacy amplification. It was found in [9, 10]
that the conditional min-entropy gives an achievable up-
per bound on the secret key length. The calculation
of the conditional min-entropy involves an optimization
over a set of quantum states. A lower bound on the
min-entropy by using the conditional von Neumann en-
tropy was established in [9, 10]. This bound holds under
the assumption of collective attacks, i.e. the state shared
∗ bratzik@thphy.uni-duesseldorf.de
between Alice and Bob after Eve’s interaction has ten-
sor product structure. In Sec. V we calculate the min-
entropy explicitly by applying recent results on its oper-
ational meaning [17]. For the qubit case, we evaluate the
min-entropy for the BB84-protocol [1] via minimum-error
discrimination (MED). For d-dimensional quantum sys-
tems, we calculate it for the generalized six-state-protocol
[18, 19] via the square-root measurement. In Sec. VI
we compare the key rates via calculation of the min-
entropy to the bound with the von Neumann entropy.
We show that our approach gives positive key rates for
a smaller number of signals compared to the von Neu-
mann approach. Furthermore we compare our results in
the d-dimensional case to the recent results in [15] for the
mentioned bound. We conclude in Sec. VII.
II. QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION
PROTOCOL
We consider an entanglement-based QKD scheme. In
the following a description of the protocol will be pro-
vided.
1. Distribution: Alice prepares N maximally entangled
states in dimension d×d, where d is the dimension of the
Hilbert space of a subsystem:
|Φ00〉 := 1√
d
d−1∑
x=0
|xx〉 , (1)
and sends the second particle to Bob. In the case of
qubits, i.e. d = 2, the state is one of the four Bell-states
|Φ+〉. After the distribution, they share N entangled
pairs, which we will denote by the state ρ˜ANBN . Under
the assumption of collective attacks, the state ρ˜ANBN is
a tensor product state, i.e. ρ˜ANBN = (ρAB)
⊗N
[9]. Alice
and Bob can symmetrize the state ρAB by applying a de-
polarizing map, leading to a d2-dimensional Bell-diagonal
state [6, 7, 15]:
ρAB =
d−1∑
j,k=0
λjk |Φjk〉 〈Φjk| , (2)
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2where |Φjk〉 = 1√d
∑d−1
s=0
(
e
2pii
d
)sk
|s〉 |(s+ j) mod d〉 are
the generalized Bell states [20]. For d = 2, the state ρAB
has the following form:
ρAB = λ00P|Φ+〉 + λ01P|Φ−〉 + λ10P|Ψ+〉 + λ11P|Ψ−〉, (3)
where P|ψ〉 = |ψ〉 〈ψ|,
∑
i,j λij = 1 and
{|Φ+〉 , |Φ−〉 , |Ψ+〉 , |Ψ−〉} is the Bell basis.
For a specific depolarizing map, one can parametrize
the state ρAB by one parameter Q, which in the two-
dimensional case is the quantum bit error rate (QBER).
The relation between Q and λjk will be explained in
Sec. V.
2. Encoding and measurement: Both parties agree on
an encoding, i.e. each quantum state is associated with
a symbol from an alphabet. They perform a projection
measurement in certain bases.
After this step Alice and Bob will share N correlated
pairs of d its (d-letter systems).
3. Sifting: In this step both parties announce for each
qudit pair the encoding they have chosen. Depending
on the protocol either they discard the data, when they
differ, or they use them for parameter estimation. The
bit string after this process has length N − n′, when n′
bits were discarded.
4. Parameter estimation (PE): Parameter estimation
serves for estimating the error in the quantum chan-
nel by using measurements, in general a positive oper-
ator valued measure (POVM). The considered state is
parametrized by the quantum bit error rate (QBER) Q
for d = 2. To measure the QBER a chosen POVM is
used. Due to the finite number of signals (m randomly
chosen signals are used) the QBER cannot be detected
perfectly. Therefore a quantification of the statistical er-
ror is needed.
After parameter estimation the number of signal states
is n = N − n′ −m.
5. Error correction (EC): In this step Alice and Bob
want to eliminate the error in their classical data, which
might be there because of eavesdropping. In order to
reconcile their data, they have to communicate publicly.
In this paper, we will use known results [9] to account for
the effect of error correction on the key.
6. Privacy amplification (PA): During the key genera-
tion, information about the key might have been revealed
to the eavesdropper. To reduce this information, Alice
and Bob apply a randomly chosen hash function from a
family of hash functions to their identical keys.
III. IMPROVED PARAMETER ESTIMATION
Parameter estimation plays an important role in fi-
nite QKD protocols. Since one has a finite number of
measurement outcomes, one needs an appropriate esti-
mate for each parameter. In this section we first remind
the reader of a method for parameter estimation used in
[9, 14, 21]. There, the parameters were estimated by dif-
ferent two-dimensional POVMs for different bases. We
will then show that we can reach a better approximation,
if we consider one specific POVM for the estimation of
all parameters. The following theorem quantifies the un-
avoidable statistical errors in the estimated parameters.
Theorem 1. [9, 14, 21] Let {Bi}|χ|i=1 be a |χ|-dimensional
POVM, ~λm = (λm(1), λm(2), .., λm(|χ|)) and ~λ∞ =
(λ∞(1), λ∞(2), .., λ∞(|χ|)) the probability distributions,
with λ(i) being the probability of outcome Bi. Here, the
index m stands for the m-fold independent application of
the POVM on identical states ρ. Let now λm := λm(k),
λ∞ := λ∞(k) denote any k-th parameter. Then except
with probability εPE
1
2
||λm − λ∞||1 ≤ ξ(εPE, |χ|,m), (4)
ξ(εPE, |χ|,m) :=
√√√√ ln( 1εPE)+ |χ| ln (m+ 1)
8m
, (5)
where ||A||1 = tr
√
A†A and ln denotes the natural loga-
rithm [22].
Proof: See Appendix.
To clarify the influence of different choices of POVMs
on secure key rates we consider a protocol, where Alice
and Bob share a state, which can be parametrized by nPE
parameters. We choose the variables of the estimation of
each parameter in a symmetric way. That means εPEi =
εPE
nPE
, |χ|i = |χ|,mi = mnPE for all i ∈ {1, ..., nPE}, such
that the constraints
∑nPE
i=1 εPEi = εPE and
∑nPE
i=1 mi = m
are fulfilled.
In previous works [9, 14] each parameter is estimated
by an individual two-dimensional POVM (in the follow-
ing we will use IPOVM as an abbreviation for this ap-
proach); e.g. for the BB84 protocol, we have two param-
eters (error rates in two bases) to estimate. Then we
need two POVMs, where each of them has two outcomes
which correspond to “Alice and Bob do have the same
measurement outcome” and “Alice and Bob do not have
the same measurement outcome” in their respective mea-
surement basis. This leads to ξ( εPE2 , 2,
m
2 ). Generally for
states determined by nPE we get ξ(
εPE
nPE
, 2, mnPE ) for each
parameter.
Concerning secure key rates we can improve this
method by considering a common POVM with nPE +
1 measurement outcomes (CPOVM approach). This
means for example for the BB84 protocol that we use a
POVM with 3 outcomes, where two of them correspond
to “Alice and Bob do not have the same measurement
outcome” in each of the two bases and one corresponds
to the completeness of the POVM. Then, the estimation
of each parameter will be represented by ξ(εPE, 3,m).
In general for nPE + 1-dimensional systems the devia-
tion from the perfect parameter (see Eq. (4)) is given
3by ξ(εPE, nPE + 1,m). The improvement is due to the
fact that in Eq. (4) the trace distance is only bounded
by ξ(εPE, |χ|,m) and that the parameters according to
the CPOVM approach lead to a smaller bound than the
IPOVM approach. The results of an explicit calculation
of the key rates will be provided in the last section.
IV. PRIVACY AMPLIFICATION AND THE
ε¯-SMOOTH MIN-ENTROPY
In this section, we will present some results about the
min-entropy. Starting from the connection of the min-
entropy to the secure key length after the privacy ampli-
fication step, we review the relation of the min-entropy
to the guessing probability given in [17].
A. The ε¯-smooth min-entropy and the secure key
length `
The ε¯-smooth conditional min-entropy provides an up-
per bound for the secure key length ` after the privacy
amplification step [10]:
` / H ε¯min(ρ⊗nXE |En), (6)
where ρXE =
∑d−1
x=0 px |x〉 〈x|⊗ρxE is a classical-quantum-
state, which Alice and the eavesdropper Eve share after
error correction. Here, X is Alice’s random variable with
values x ∈ {0, ..., d− 1}, where d is the dimension of the
quantum system. The eavesdropper holds a quantum
state ρxE , which is correlated with the random variable
X. The symbol En denotes the eavesdropper’s system.
The parameter n is the number of signals after sifting
and parameter estimation, i.e. n = N − n′ −m.
In the following we will denote the state ρXE as a
single-signal state, i.e. following the description above,
both parties share one single state (n = 1). Otherwise,
the state will be denoted by ρ⊗nXE , if it has tensor product
structure. We treat collective attacks, as the state shared
between Alice and Eve has in this case tensor product
structure. Collective attacks [23? ] are those attacks
where the eavesdropper is restricted to interact with each
of the signals separately, i.e. by attaching an auxiliary
system and performing unitary transformations. In [6, 7]
it was shown that it suffices to consider a convex combi-
nation of product states, when analyzing the full security
of QKD protocols. However, it does not follow that we
can consider w.l.o.g. a product state.
We recall the definition of the ε¯-smooth min-entropy:
Definition 1 (ε¯-smooth min-entropy [10]). Let ρ¯XE ∈
Bε¯/2(ρXE) := {ρ¯XE ≥ 0 :
∥∥ρ¯XE − ρXE∥∥1 ≤ ε¯}. The
ε¯-smooth min-entropy is defined as:
H ε¯min(ρXE |E) := sup
ρ¯XE
Hmin(ρ¯XE |E), (7)
with
Hmin(ρ¯XE |E) = sup
σE
[− log2 (minλ : λ · 1X ⊗ σE ≥ ρ¯XE)] .
(8)
The optimization in Eq. (7) is done over the states ρ¯XE
in the ε¯-environment of ρXE , whereas the optimization
in Eq. (8) is over all states σE .
B. The min-entropy and the guessing probability
The evaluation in Eq. (7) is a convex optimization
problem. It was shown in [17], that the min-entropy can
be rewritten as the negative logarithm of the optimal
guessing probability pguess :
Hmin(ρXE |E) = − log2 pguess, (9)
where
pguess ≡ pguess(X|E) := max{ExE}
d−1∑
x=0
pxtr(E
x
Eρ
x
E). (10)
Here it was used that the initial state ρXE is a classical-
quantum state (see above), which is shared between Al-
ice and Eve, the eavesdropper. The set {ExE} denotes the
POVM elements of Eve, which she uses in order to dis-
tinguish her nonorthogonal ancilla states ρxE . If she could
perfectly discriminate them, she would know the value of
Alice’s random variable X and therefore the content of
the secret key.
V. EVALUATION OF THE GUESSING
PROBABILITY
In this section we will present an explicit calculation
of the guessing probability in Eq. (10) for d-dimensional
quantum systems for the generalized six-state-protocol
via square-root measurement (see e.g. [24–29]), and
for qubit-systems (d = 2) for the BB84-protocol via
minimum-error discrimination [26, 30–33]. The problem
of distinguishing two mixed quantum states with min-
imum error was solved by Helstrøm [32], but for more
states it becomes more involved. For quantum states
with a certain symmetry, optimal measurements were
found (see e.g. [29]), whereas for arbitrary states only
bounds exist [34]. Finally, we draw a conclusion from the
additivity of the min-entropy for tensor product states:
for a set of symmetric tensor product states the opti-
mal minimum-error discrimination (MED) measurement
is the optimal MED measurement on the subsystems.
A. Generalized six-state-protocol for d-dimensional
quantum systems
In this part we consider a (d+1)-bases protocol, which
was introduced in [35–37]. It is a generalization of the
4six-state protocol [18, 19]. We further assume a collective
eavesdropping attack. Due to symmetrizations [6] the
eavesdropper is forced to introduce the same error in each
measurement basis. This symmetrization leads to the
following Bell-diagonal state shared between Alice and
Bob (see Section II):
ρAB = (β0 − β1) |Φ00〉 〈Φ00|+ β1
d
1d2 , (11)
with β0 + (d − 1)β1 = 1, 0 ≤ β1 < 1d < β0 ≤ 1 and 1d2
being the identity matrix of size d2. Note that this form
is equal to the one considered in [38, 39]. The parameter
β0 can be seen as the probability that both get the same
output, whereas β1 denotes the probability that they get
a particular other one. The error rate Q is given by
Q := 1 − β0 = (d − 1)β1; for d = 2, Q is the quantum
bit error rate β1. The state in Eq. (11) can be recovered
from Eq. (2) by setting λ00 = 1 − d+1d (1 − β0) and all
other λjk =
(1−β0)
d(d−1) =
β1
d .
We assume that Eve holds a purification |ψABE〉. Eve’s
reduced state is [38]
ρE =
1
d
β0 d−1∑
x=0
|Exx〉 〈Exx|+ β1
∑
x,y
y 6=x
|Exy〉 〈Exy|
 ,
(12)
and we define the normalized states ρxE as:
ρxE := β0 |Exx〉 〈Exx|+ β1
∑
y 6=x
|Exy〉 〈Exy| , (13)
such that Eve’s state is given by ρE =
1
d
∑
x ρ
x
E . Eve’s
ancilla states |Exy〉 have a specific form in order to fulfill
the requirement in Eq. (11). They can be written in
terms of an orthonormal basis of Eve {|fi,j〉E}:
|Exy〉 =
{
1√
β0
∑d−1
k=0
√
λ0,kω
xk |f0,k〉E for x = y
1√
d
∑d−1
k=0 ω
xk |fy−x,k〉E for x 6= y,
(14)
with ω := e2pii/d and λj,k given above. The ancilla states
with x = y have a fixed angle between each other, they
are called pyramid states [39]. They fulfill
〈Exy|Ex′y′〉 =

1 if x = x′ and y = y′,
1− β1β0 if x = y 6= x′ = y′,
0 otherwise.
The eavesdropper would like to know Alice’s and Bob’s
classical value x and y, respectively. For the case x 6= y
she knows both values with certainty, as those ancilla
states are orthogonal and she can perfectly discriminate
them. For the case x = y, Eve has to discriminate d pyra-
mid states. Measurements for such symmetrical states
exist, and it is known that the error-minimizing mea-
surement for such states is the square-root measurement
[24–29]. The following results for the tomographic pro-
tocol were derived in [39, 40]:
The state in Eq. (12) can be rewritten as:
ρE = β0ρ
(=) + (1− β0)ρ(6=), (15)
where the density operator ρ(=) = 1d
∑d−1
x=0 |Exx〉 〈Exx|
denotes the cases, when Alice and Bob have the
same values, whereas in the case of ρ(6=) =
1
d(d−1)
∑
y 6=x |Exy〉 〈Exy| their values are different. The
eavesdropper wants to find their common values, so she
wants to discriminate those ancilla states for x = y. The
POVM elements |exx〉 〈exx|, that discriminate the pyra-
mid states with minimum error, are given via
|exx〉 = 1√
dρ(=)
|Exx〉 ,
i.e. the name square-root measurement is related to the
construction of the elements. An explicit calculation for
the operator 1√
dρ(=)
results in [39]:
1√
dρ(=)
=
(r0 +
√
r0r1 + r1)1− ρ(=)√
r0r1(
√
r0 +
√
r1)
,
where r0 = 1− d−1d β1β0 is the eigenvalue corresponding to
the eigenvector
∑
x |Exx〉 and r1 = β1dβ0 is the (d − 1)-
fold eigenvalue for the eigenvector (|Exx〉 − 1d
∑
y |Eyy〉).
From this the overlap 〈exx|Eyy〉 can be calculated as
〈exx|Eyy〉 = √η0δxy +√η1(1− δxy),
with
√
η0 =
√
r0+(d−1)√r1√
d
,
√
η1 =
√
r0+
√
r1√
d
and δxy the
Kronecker delta. The probability η0 denotes the proba-
bility that Eve, when finding |exx〉, knows that Alice and
Bob share the value x and η1 denotes the probability that
they hold one of the other d− 1 values.
The eavesdropper’s probability to guess the right value
of Alice consists of the following parts: the probabil-
ity (1 − β0) that the density operator ρ(6=) appears (see
Eq. (15)) and the probability β0 that ρ
(=) appears multi-
plied with the probability that she guesses the right value
in this case, which was η0 (see above). Inserting r0 and r1
into η0, we get an expression for the guessing probability
depending on d and the error rate Q = 1− β0:
psix-stateguess (d,Q) = 1− β0 + β0η0 = Q+
(1−Q)
d
[
1− (d− 2)Q
d(Q− 1) + 2(d− 1)
√
dQ− (d+ 1)Q2
(d− 1)d2(1−Q)2
]
. (16)
5B. BB84 for qubit-systems
A strategy to distinguish two nonorthogonal quantum
states is called minimal-error discrimination (MED) (see
[26, 30–33]). In MED for each measurement one has a
conclusive result, but with probability perr the result is
erroneous. It was shown by Helstrøm [32] that the maxi-
mal probability to make a correct guess when distinguish-
ing two quantum states ρ0E and ρ
1
E that appear with the
same probability p0 = p1 =
1
2 is given by
pguess(2, Q) = 1− pminerr =
1
2
(
1 +
1
2
∥∥ρ0E − ρ1E∥∥1) . (17)
In order to calculate
∥∥ρ0E − ρ1E∥∥1, we express the states
ρ0E and ρ
1
E (see Eq. (13)) in terms of the computational
basis of Eve.
Assuming that Eve has a purifying system of the state
in Eq. (3), and that Alice and Bob perform a von Neu-
mann measurement, one can derive an expression for∥∥ρ0E − ρ1E∥∥1 for the BB84-protocol. The operator ρ0E−ρ1E
can be written as
ρ0E − ρ1E = 2
√
λ00λ01 (|00〉〈01|+ |01〉〈00|)
+2
√
λ10λ11 (|10〉〈11|+ |11〉〈01|) , (18)
so
|ρ0E − ρ1E | = 2
√
λ00λ01
(
P|00〉 + P|01〉
)
+2
√
λ10λ11
(
P|10〉 + P|11〉
)
, (19)
with |A| =
√
A†A. The eigenvalues 2
√
λ00λ01 and
2
√
λ10λ11 occur with multiplicity 2. Thus the 1-norm
is
1
2
∥∥ρ0E − ρ1E∥∥1 = 2√λ00λ01 + 2√λ10λ11. (20)
The error rates in the z- and x-direction are ez =
λ10 + λ11 and ex = λ01 + λ11 (see [10, 12]). There re-
mains one free parameter, that we have to optimize to
obtain the best case for Eve. We adopt the method in
[12, Appendix A] to maximize the probability of cor-
rect guess in Eq. (17): according to [12], we choose
λ00 = (1−Q)(1−u), λ01 = (1−Q)u, λ10 = Q(1−v) and
λ11 = Qv, with u, v ∈ [0, 1] and the additional constraint
(from λ01 + λ11 = Q)
(1−Q)u+Qv = Q. (21)
Defining |Φij〉 as the corresponding Bell states to the
value λij , the purification of the state ρAB can be written
as |ψABE〉 =
∑
ij
√
λij |Φij〉AB ⊗ |eij〉E , where {|eij〉} is
a four-dimensional orthonormal basis. Using Eq. (20)
and the constraint given in Eq. (21) we find a function,
which depends on the parameter v:
1
2
∥∥ρ0E − ρ1E∥∥1 = f(v) := 2√(1− v) Q [1 + (v − 2)Q]
+2
√
(1− v) v Q2. (22)
Finding the maximum of the expression leads to the
result u = v = Q and finally to the expressions of λij :
λ00 = (1 − Q)2, λ01 = λ10 = (1 − Q)Q and λ11 = Q2.
This gives the guessing probability:
pBB84guess (2, Q) =
1
2
(
1 + 2
√
(1−Q)Q
)
. (23)
By using the same methods we can derive the guessing
probability for the six-state protocol, which lead to the
same result as derived in Eq. (16):
psix−stateguess (2, Q) =
1
2
(
1 +
√
Q(2− 3Q) +Q
)
. (24)
C. Optimal multistate MED measurement from
additivity of min-entropy
We know from [10] that the min-entropy is addi-
tive, i.e. for tensor product states ρ⊗nXE it holds that
Hmin(ρ
⊗n
XE |En) = nHmin(ρXE |E). The min-entropy is
a function of the probability of a correct guess of Eve’s
states. The state ρ⊗nXE is of the form:
ρ⊗nXE =
(
1
d
d−1∑
x=0
|x〉 〈x| ⊗ ρxE
)⊗n
(25)
=
1
dn
∑
x∈{0,...,d−1}n
|x〉 〈x| ⊗ ρxEn , (26)
where
ρxEn =
n−1⊗
i=0
ρxiE (27)
and x = (x0, ..., xn−1) is a vector of length n with xi ∈
{0, ..., d− 1}. Thus, Eve’s state is given by
ρ⊗nE =
1
dn
∑
x
ρxEn (28)
and is a sum of tensor product states, see Eq. (27). The
explicit minimum-error discrimination problem is to dis-
tinguish the set of states {ρxEn} for different x. We can
conclude from the additivity of the min-entropy, that for
the set of states given in Eq. (27) the optimal MED mea-
surement consists of optimal MED measurements on the
single-signal states ρxiE . This result is interesting, as in
general measurements in the total Hilbert space may lead
to higher guessing probabilities than measurements in in-
dividual subspaces. To the best of our knowledge, this
result is not known in the context of state discrimination.
VI. COMPARISON OF KEY RATES
In this chapter we provide the results of parameter es-
timation with CPOVM (see Sec. III) and those of the
6calculation of the min-entropy (see Sec. V). We first re-
view some results about finite-key distribution.
For a finite number of signals, the achievable secure
key rate is found to be [9, 14]:
`1/N =
n
N
(Sξ(ρXE |E) + ∆− leakEC) + 2
N
log2 (2εPA) ,
(29)
with ∆ := −7
√
log2 (2/ε¯)
n , the total security parameter ε
(see e.g. [14, 21])
ε = εPA + εEC + εPE + ε¯ (30)
and Sξ(ρXE |E) := minρ¯XE∈Γξ S(ρXE |E). The set Γξ =
{σ : 12 |λm − λ∞(σ)| ≤ ξ} contains all states compatible
with the statistics in parameter estimation. The condi-
tional von Neumann entropy with the correction term
∆ is a lower bound on the ε¯-smooth min-entropy. The
leakage term leakEC is taken from [12] to be leakEC =
1.2h(Q) for εEC = 10
−10, where h(x) is the binary en-
tropy. Throughout all calculations, we assume asymmet-
ric protocols with a symmetric attack. An asymmetric
protocol means that one only keeps the measurement re-
sults of one particular basis for the key; the other results
are used for parameter estimation. In the case of proto-
cols with (d + 1) bases (e.g. the six-state protocol with
d = 2) this basis is chosen with probability q = (1− dp)
and the other d bases with probability p. For proto-
cols with 2 bases (e.g. the BB84-protocol with d = 2)
q = 1− p. Taking the largest deviation ξi from the per-
fect parameter in one measurement basis and equating
it with the other deviations, leads to a symmetric choice
of parameters mi and εPEi , i.e. mi =
m
d+1 (mi =
m
2 for
2−bases protocols) and εPEi = εPEd+1 (εPEi = εPE2 ) (see
section III). This assumption gives a lower bound on the
secret key rate. The number of signals used for parameter
estimation is given by m = Np2.
In order to calculate the key rate, we fix ε and εEC and
maximize `1/N in Eq. (29) for the parameters εPE, εPA, ε¯
and q with a computational software program (Mathe-
matica) under the constraint given in Eq. (30).
A. Key rates via von Neumann entropy for
different approaches of parameter estimation
For a comparison of the approaches (IPOVM,
CPOVM) explained in Sec. III we consider the asymmet-
ric BB84- and six-state-protocol for a symmetric attack
for dimension d = 2 as discussed in [9]. In the calcula-
tion of the key rates via the von Neumann entropy (see
Eq. (29)) we use a QBER of Q = 0.05 and a total security
parameter of ε = 10−9 (see Eq. (30)). The conditional
von Neumann entropy for the six-state protocol is given
by [9, 12]:
Ssix−state(ρXE |E) = (1−Q)
[
1− h
(
1− 32Q
1−Q
)]
(31)
and for the BB84-protocol
SBB84(ρXE |E) = 1− h(Q). (32)
The variables ξ for parameter estimation used in this
comparison are summarized in Tab. I. Note that the sym-
metrized state is parametrized by only one parameter.
This has no influence on the IPOVM approach, in con-
trast to CPOVM, where the number of POVM outcomes
can be reduced from 3 for BB84 (4 for six-state) to 2 (2).
BB84 six-state
IPOVM ξ( εPE
2
, 2, m
2
) ξ( εPE
3
, 2, m
3
)
CPOVM ξ(εPE, 2,m) ξ(εPE, 2,m)
TABLE I. Deviations ξ from perfect parameter (see Eq. (4)
in Sec. III) for different parameter estimation approaches
(IPOVM and CPOVM): BB84 and six-state protocol.
The results are shown in Fig. 1 and 2. We point
out that our CPOVM approach leads to higher key rates
for the BB84- and six-state-protocol. In particular for
signals N . 1011, the numerical analysis reveals the im-
portance of parameter estimation. While the CPOVM
approach leads for N = 106 signals to a 72% (35%)
higher key rate than the IPOVM approach for the six-
state- (BB84-) protocol, the improvement for N = 1010
is still 3% (2%).
FIG. 1. (Color online) Comparison of the key rates (calcu-
lated via the von Neumann entropy, see Eqs. (29) and (32))
using different parameter estimations for asymmetric BB84-
protocol; ε = 10−9, Q = 5%; squares (red): CPOVM, trian-
gles (black): IPOVM (see Sec. III for explanations).
B. Key rates via the min-entropy for
two-dimensional quantum systems
In this section we exploit the preceding results from
Sec. V regarding the min-entropy in order to compute the
7FIG. 2. (Color online) Comparison of the key rates (calcu-
lated via the von Neumann entropy, see Eqs. (29) and (31)) us-
ing different parameter estimations for asymmetric six-state-
protocol; ε = 10−9, Q = 5%; squares (red): CPOVM, trian-
gles (black): IPOVM (see Sec. III for explanations).
secret key rate and compare it to the key rate calculated
with Eq. (29).
We explained in Sec. IV that the achievable upper
bound on the secure key length ` after the privacy am-
plification step is given by Eq. (6). We can derive a key
rate by using the following bounds [10, Lemma 3.2.6]:
H ε¯min(ρ
⊗n
XE |En) ≥ nH ε¯/nmin(ρXE |E) ≥ nHmin(ρXE |E);
(33)
the last inequality is a very good approximation as ε¯ is
in the order of 10−10. Thus, we arrive at the following
key rate:
`2/N =
n
N
(Hmin,ξ(ρXE |E)− leakEC) + 2
N
log2 (2εPA) ,
(34)
where the leakage term leakEC and εPA are the
same as in Eq. (29), and Hmin,ξ(ρXE |E) :=
minρ¯XE∈Γξ Hmin(ρXE |E) (see Eq. (29)). We calcu-
late this key rate using the connection to the guessing
probability, i.e. Hprotocolmin (ρXE |E) = − log2 pprotocolguess (see
Eq. (9)), and compare it to the key rate given in Eq. (29).
The guessing probability for the specific protocol is given
by Eqs. (23) and (24).
In Fig. 3 the threshold number of signals N0, where the
key rate becomes non-zero, is plotted as a function of the
QBER Q. For parameter estimation, we have considered
the CPOVM approach (see Sec. III) with the variables
given in Tab. I. Additionally, we have plotted the key
rate via the von Neumann entropy (Eq. (29)) for the
IPOVM approach. In comparison to the von Neumann
approximation (Eq. (29)), only 1/2 (7/10) of the number
of signals is needed for non-zero key rates in the six-state-
protocol for Q = 0.2% (Q = 3.8%), when using the min-
entropy. For the BB84-protocol, only 1/2 (9/10) of the
number of signals is needed for Q = 0.2% (Q = 3.8%).
FIG. 3. (Color online) Threshold value N0 (number of
signals, where the key rate becomes non-zero) vs QBER
Q with ε = 10−9 and εEC = 10−10; triangles (red):
BB84-protocol, squares (black): six-state-protocol; filled:
min-entropy (Eq. (34)), open: von Neumann entropy with
CPOVM approach (Eq. (29)), dashed line: von Neumann
entropy (Eq. (29)) with IPOVM approach (see Sec. III for
explanations).
Thus, by calculating a key rate explicitly with the min-
entropy, we get positive key rates for a smaller number
of signals than via the von Neumann entropy approach.
This behavior can be explained by the correction term ∆
in the key rate in Eq. (29). For a small number of total
signals N , this correction term is not a good approxima-
tion and has a big impact on the key rate.
We point out that for low Q we can achieve non-zero
key rates with only O(104) − O(105) signals. Note that
in [41] it was considered a “milestone” to reach non-zero
key rates for significantly less than 105 − 106 signals.
C. Key rates via the min-entropy for d-dimensional
quantum systems
In [15] the influence of the dimension on the key rate
was discussed. Exploiting the results from this paper,
we discuss the improvement for higher-dimensional quan-
tum systems. Throughout this part we only consider the
(d+ 1)-bases protocols, such as the six-state-protocol for
d = 2. Furthermore, we adapt our CPOVM approach
and by using Eq. (4) from Sec. III we get ξ (εPE, 2,m).
The correction term to the d-dimensional von Neumann
entropy is given in [42] as ∆ = −(2 log2 d+ 3)
√
log2(2/ε¯)
n
and the leakage term is characterized by leakEC =
1.2hd(Q) with hd(p) := −p log2
(
p
d−1
)
−(1−p) log2(1−p).
The conditional von Neumann entropy was calculated in
8[15] as
Sd(ρXE |E) = (1−Q)
[
log2 d− hd
(
1− 1−
d+1
d Q
1−Q
)]
,
(35)
where Q = 1 − β0 denotes the error rate in the sifted
key. We will compare the key rate calculated via the d-
dimensional conditional von Neumann entropy, with the
one via the d-dimensional min-entropy. The latter can
be obtained by using
Hdmin(ρXE |E) = − log2 pguess(d,Q), (36)
where pguess(d,Q) was given in Eq. (16).
In order to quantify the number of signals, we have
scaled N0 with log2 d, as for example sending one state
in the dimension d = 4 corresponds to sending two states
in the dimension d = 2. For making the key rate compa-
rable to the two-dimensional case, it has to be divided by
log2 d. The dimensions are prime numbers as complete
mutually unbiased bases can be formed for primes and
prime powers (see e.g. review article [43]).
FIG. 4. (Color online) Key rates with d-dimensional condi-
tional von Neumann entropy (Eq. (35)) plotted versus scaled
total number of signals for a fixed error rate Q = 5%. This
is analogous to [15], where a different scale was used for the
axes.
Figure 4 shows the behavior of the key rate calculated
with Eq. (35) for different dimensions. In contrast to
[15], we scaled the key rate with the dimension. It can
be seen from the plot, that higher dimensions are advan-
tageous as the key rate increases. In order to obtain the
behavior for a small number of signals, Fig. 5 provides
a magnification of this area. The higher the dimension,
the more the point, where the key rate becomes non-zero
is shifted to the right (apart from the case d = 2). This
might be due to the correction term, as it scales linearly
with the dimension, so for higher dimension, more is sub-
tracted from the conditional von Neumann entropy. We
will see in the next paragraph, that the min-entropy ap-
FIG. 5. (Color online) Key rates with d-dimensional condi-
tional von Neumann entropy (Eq. (35)) plotted versus scaled
total number of signals for a fixed error rate Q = 5% (Mag-
nification of Fig. 4).
proach has an advantage over the von Neumann entropy
approach for a small number of signals.
FIG. 6. (Color online) Threshold value N0 (number of signals,
where the key rate is positive) vs QBER with ε = 10−9 and
εEC = 10
−10 for different dimensions d ∈ {2, 3, 7, 17}. Dashed
line: min-entropy (Eq. (36)), straight line: von Neumann en-
tropy (Eq. (35)).
In Fig. 6 we compare the number N0, where the key
rate becomes non-zero, for key rates using the quanti-
ties given in Eqs. (35) and (36) for different dimensions.
It can be seen that the min-entropy approach is better
throughout the presented error rates. The advantage of
the min-entropy approach (Eq. (36)) over the von Neu-
mann approach (Eq. (35)) augments with increasing di-
mensions. This can be explained again with the correc-
tion term that scales linearly with the dimension. When
comparing higher dimensions to the qubit case, one can
see that for certain error rates the dimensions bigger than
9two are advantegous. The dimension d = 3 for example,
gives a lower threshold value N0 for non-zero key rates
than the qubit case throughout all the presented error
rates.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have improved the secret key rates in QKD with
a finite number of signals, by considering parameter es-
timation to be implemented by a single POVM for all
parameters. Additionally, we have calculated the min-
entropy for a single-signal state in d-dimensions explic-
itly by using its operational meaning via the guessing
probability. We showed that using this ansatz for a small
number of signals leads to computable non-zero key rates.
This advantage of the min-entropy might be due to the
correction term ∆ in key rate calculations using the con-
ditional von Neumann entropy [9, 14, 15], as this cor-
rection is big for a small number of signals. This cor-
rection term scales linearly with the dimension, so an
improvement for high dimensions (up to d = 17) is found
by calculating the min-entropy. Thus higher-dimensional
systems might be advantageous when resources are lim-
ited. As a spin-off, we have deduced from the additivity
property of the min-entropy and its relation to the guess-
ing probability, that the optimal minimum-error discrim-
ination measurement (MED) for a set of tensor product
states with a certain symmetry is the optimal MED mea-
surement on each subsystem.
Considering the importance of finite-key analysis for
practical implementations, we have shown that non-zero
secure key rates can be achieved already with 104 − 105
signals per run.
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Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. We first show that Prob
[
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣~λm − ~λ∞∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
> 2ξ
]
≤
εPE. Starting from the law of large numbers [44],
Prob
[
D(~λm||~λ∞) > 2ξ′
]
≤ 2−m
(
2ξ′−|χ| log2 (m+1)m
)
,
(A1)
with D(~λm||~λ∞) :=
∑|χ|
i=1 λm(i) log2
(
λm(i)
λ∞(i)
)
and using
[44]
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣~λm − ~λ∞∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
≤
√
D(~λm||~λ∞) ln 2
2
, (A2)
we result in
Prob
[
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣~λm − ~λ∞∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
>
√
2ξ′ ln 2
2
]
(A2)
≤ Prob
√D(~λm||~λ∞) ln 2
2
>
√
2ξ′ ln 2
2

(A1)
≤ 2−m(2ξ′−|χ| log (m+1)m ). (A3)
For ξ :=
√
2ξ′ ln 2
2 it follows:
Prob
[
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣~λm − ~λ∞∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
> 2ξ
]
= Prob
[
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣~λm − ~λ∞∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
>
√
2(4ξ′) ln 2
2
]
(A3)
≤ 2−m(2(4ξ′)−|χ| log (m+1)m )
= 2
−m
(
8 ξ
2
ln 2−|χ| log (m+1)m
)
=: εPE.
Then except with probability εPE, the following holds:
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣~λm − ~λ∞∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
≤ 2ξ
with ξ =
√
ln
(
1
εPE
)
+|χ| ln (m+1)
8m . It remains to show that
1
2
||λm − λ∞||1 ≡
1
2
|λm − λ∞| ≤ 1
2
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣~λm − ~λ∞∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
.
Remember that we denote by λm := λm(k) and λ∞ :=
λ∞(k) any k-th parameter. The normalization conditions
of the POVM
∑|χ|
i=1 λ∞(i) = 1 =
∑|χ|
i=1 λm(i) lead to
|λm − λ∞| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
|χ|∑
i=1,i6=k
λm(i)− λ∞(i)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∆≤
|χ|∑
i=1,i6=k
|λm(i)− λ∞(i)| (A4)
and
|χ|∑
i=1
|λm(i)− λ∞(i)|
(A4)
≥ 2|λm − λ∞|.
The assertion follows by multiplication with factor 14 .
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